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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE THE INCEPTION of powered flight over a century
ago, aviation has undergone many phases of technological
advancement and regulatory changes. The Wright Brothers'
first flight, from liftoff to touchdown, encompassed a distance
that is less than the wingspan of today's modern jetliner.1 The
sensation of freedom that undoubtedly accompanied that his-
toric first flight has since been augmented with countless rules
and regulations.
This article will explore the agreements between and among
airlines and airports, as they relate to landing fees, terminal
space leases, and gate leases. Any such agreements may not be
viewed, however, in a vacuum. A multitude of factors exist that,
to varying degrees, bear on these agreements, both directly and
indirectly. Although by no means an exhaustive list, some of
these factors include: the exclusivity of the agreement, the air-
line's status as signatory or non-signatory, the duration of the
agreement, and non-aeronautical concessionaire agreements.
Moreover, of great significance is the enactment of The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978,2 which arguably changed the airline
industry forever.
Accordingly, the first part of this article will provide a histori-
cal background of aviation legislation in terms of the foundation
it laid for future agreements. Secondly, it will explore the intro-
duction of The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the pre-
sent regulatory structure. The impact of this legislation on
airlines, airports, and their previously-entered-into agreements
is of great import. Next will be an analysis of the agreements'
elements, including the various areas of negotiation between air-
lines and airports. Finally, we will conclude with an assessment
of the merits of the present system and its potential problems.
1 The flight covered a distance of 120 feet. The Wright Brothers - First Flight,
1903, Eye Witness to History, at http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (2003) (last
visited May 31, 2005). The wingspan of the Boeing 757 is 124 feet, 10 inches. US
AIRWAYS B-757/B-767 PILOT's HANDBOOK 5-1.
2 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified




It is noteworthy at the outset that the term "Deregulation"
should not be construed to mean absence of regulation. While a
detailed examination of the aviation industry's regulatory his-
tory is necessarily beyond the scope of this article, it will never-
theless prove useful to provide a brief overview of the legislation
which formed the basis for today's environment. Regulation of
the Transportation industry traces its genesis to the days of the
railroads.' Of primary interest to the federal government were
anti-trust concerns.4 For example, dating back to 1912, in United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, the Supreme
Court held that the actions of some thirty-eight defendant rail-
roads, in attempting to unify the railway terminal facilities serv-
ing St. Louis, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.5 Further
discussion of this topic will be deferred until later in this article,
but, suffice it to say, such concerns have shown no indication of
acquiescence in the ensuing years.
A. AIR MAIL ACTS
Aviation itself has been subjected to various forms of scrutiny
and regulation as early as the days of the Air Mail Contracts,
beginning with the Air Mail Act of 1925,6 also known as the Kelly
Act, which gave the Post Office the right to contract with air
carriers for airmail service.7 The first amendment to this act
provided that airlines would be paid by the pound for carrying
mail; the second amendment decreased the cost of an airmail
stamp, thereby fostering the public's use of the airmail system.8
"The Post Office's airmail department was no longer legally
forced to operate at a profit under the provisions of this second
amendment; hence, the airlines could actually be subsidized."9
As will be seen under the discussion of Deregulation, infra, such
subsidization ceased to exist in the Deregulated era.
3 See generally United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383
(1912).
4 Id.
Id. (interpreting Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (cur-
rent version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004)).
6 Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (current version at 39 U.S.C.
§§ 5401-02 (2004)).
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The profitability of the airmail contracts provided little incen-
tive for the carriage of passengers.1 ° The Air Mail Act of 1930,11
also known as the McNary-Watres Act, was enacted in an attempt
to create such an incentive for the airlines. 12 The 1930 Act au-
thorized the Postmaster General to extend the life of existing
mail contracts by converting them into route certificates, grant-
ing route extensions, or subjecting them to competitive bid-
ding.13 A by-product of this was that competitive bidding
became a requirement for the awarding of contracts for new
routes or to airlines not currently engaged in a mail contract. 14
As a result, competition between airlines became regulated, and
airlines began to consolidate. 5 The airlines that emerged
under this scheme "were to fly almost free of competition for
the next forty-five years."' 6 It may be said that this marked the
beginning of the regulated era that prevailed within the industry
until the introduction of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
B. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
The next significant legislation was the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938,17 sometimes referred to as the McCarran-Lea Act. This
act established a five-member board, known as the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority (CAA), with the responsibility of overseeing
activities within the aviation industry.' One of these responsi-
bilities was the issuance of Certificates of Convenience and Ne-
cessity to those air carriers who were providing service at the
time of enactment of the McCarran-Lea Act. 9 These duties were
subsequently transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
created under the Reorganization Act of 1939.21 "A board-is-
sued certificate is required before any carrier may provide air
service in this country. The criteria for certification.., require
the applicant to be 'fit, willing and able' and that the service be
10 Id. at 55.
11 Air Mail Act of 1930, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (current version at 39 U.S.C.
§§ 5401-02 (2004)).
12 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 55.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 56.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
18 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 59.
19 Id.
20 Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561 (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 1101 (2004)).
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required by the 'public convenience and necessity.' '' 21 Such
regulatory legislation "was promulgated... to avoid the deleteri-
ous consequences of cutthroat and excessive competition, and
thereby enhance economic stability, safety, and the sound
growth and development of this young industry. ' 22 The CAB
retained its regulatory power until the enactment of the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, to be discussed later in this article. 3
C. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
The Federal Aviation Act 24 was enacted in 1958, ostensibly in
response to several accidents within the industry.25 Largely as a
result of the introduction of jet transport aircraft in the mid
1950s, numerous industry growing pains were identified.26
Among these were outdated Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities
and equipment, "undersized runways and crowded terminal
buildings. '2 7 Perhaps most significant, the Federal Aviation Act,
inter alia, abolished the CAA and gave its responsibilities to the
newly created Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).28 While many of
the CAB's former duties and responsibilities were also trans-
ferred to the FAA, the CAB "retained economic control of U.S.
air carriers in a practically unaltered way."2z9 This economic con-
trol was vested in the CAB until its ultimate demise in 1985.30
D. AiRPORT AND AiRWAYS DEVELOPMENT ACT
The next relevant enactment was that of the Airport and Air-
ways Development Act of 1970,31 "designed to meet new de-
mands for public air transportation needs.3 2 While much of
21 JEFFREY R. MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK 9 (Merton House
1981).
22 Suzanne Imes, Airline Passenger Facility Charges: What Do They Mean for an Ail-
ing Industry ?, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1039, 1042-43 (1995) (quoting Paul S. Demp-
sey, Transportation Deregulation - On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANsp. LJ. 329, 335
(1984)).
23 MILLER, supra note 21, at 11.
24 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at 49
U.S.C. §§ 40101-19 (2004)).
25 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 61.
26 Id. at 60.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 61.
29 Id.
30 MILLER, supra note 21, at 11.
31 Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219.
32 ROLLO, supra note 7, at 67.
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the prior legislation was directed toward the air carriers and
their operations, the Airport and Airways Development Act fo-
cused on the airports. "A controversial portion of the act is the
requirement for airport operating certificates for those airports
served by air carriers.""3 Critics aver that the minimum safety
standards set forth in the Federal Aviation Regulations for ob-
taining such operating certificates resulted in the federal gov-
ernment gaining "considerable control over airports."34
E. AiRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The final piece of legislation of historical significance is, of
course, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA). "The over-
riding objective of the act is to foster competition within the
airline industry. Other objectives include encouraging the entry
of new and existing air carriers into new markets; continuing
service to small communities; and encouraging use of secondary
airports. ' 35 Among its many provisions was the demise of the
CAB in 1985, at which time the Department of Transportation
(DOT) assumed many of the CAB's former responsibilities. 6
The next section of this article will explore the impact of the
ADA on airport and airline agreements, as well as the operation
of the airline industry in the current deregulated environment.
III. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE CURRENT
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
As its name implies, with the ADA came an industry trend to-
ward increased competition and away from regulation. In some
instances, the move from regulation to deregulation was gradual
and incremental. One such instance is the Essential Air Ser-
vice 7 provision of the ADA, which ensured that those communi-
ties which had previously been served by a certificated air carrier
would continue to have such service for a period of ten years
after the enactment of the ADA.38 The CAB devised procedures
for identifying these "eligible points" and for determining ap-
propriate levels of service. 9 An eligible point was primarily de-
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 MILLER, supra note 21, at 11.
36 Id.
37 14 C.F.R. § 325 (1980).




fined as "[a] ny point in the United States ... to which any direct
air carrier was authorized, under a certificate issued by the
CAB ... to provide air service on October 24, 1978, whether or
not such service was actually provided. '40 This provision was no
longer enforced upon the expiration of the ten-year period.
A. HUB AND SPOKE SYSTEM
A prominent characteristic of this increase in competition
under deregulation is reflected in the development of hub and
spoke route structures.4' Although "[s]uch route structures
were certainly not unknown under regulation ... they were not
characteristic of the pre-deregulation airlines."4 2 Statistics indi-
cate that in 1977 (pre-deregulation), departures from Dallas
and Chicago comprised only 25.0% of American's flights, while
Denver and Chicago departures accounted for a mere 19.6% of
United's flights.43 In contrast, figures for 1985, seven years after
deregulation, show that the hub and spoke structure at those
cities increased their share of domestic departures to 38.0% for
American and 30.6% for United.' 4 Under this now familiar
method of operation, airlines pick up passengers at outlying air-
ports (spoke) and fly them to a primary airport (hub)." While
some passengers may in fact be destined for the hub airport,
many passengers will be continuing their journey beyond this
point.46 After deplaning at the hub airport, these connecting
passengers will "combine with passengers from other origin cit-
ies plus those who begin their journeys at the hub to make up
enough traffic to fill a plane from their hub to their
destinations. "4
The success of a hub and spoke system is, in large measure,
dependent upon an airline's access to gate and terminal facili-
ties at the hub airport. "Typically, an airline requires at least five
gates to create a small hub."4 The existence of long-term lease
agreements, discussed infra, greatly impacts such accessibility for
40 14 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (2004).
41 Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strat-
egy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 411 (1987).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 412.
4 Id.
45 Id. at 443.
46 Id,
47 Id.
48 Note, The Antitrust Implications of Airport Lease Restrictions, 104 HARv. L. REv.
548, 558-59 (1990).
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airlines attempting to gain entry into a particular airport.49 One
or more airlines holding long-term, exclusive leases at a hub air-
port "can reduce its new entrant rival's ability to attract traffic to
its service by forcing it to accommodate its schedule to the avail-
ability of a gate, thus disrupting its connections at its distant
hub."5 Through majority-in-interest clauses, discussed infra, in-
cumbent airlines further have the ability to approve (or, per-
haps more significantly, disapprove) critical airport construction
projects, thereby influencing and controlling availability of ter-
minal facilities.5'
B. INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION
Another important by-product of deregulation has been the
consolidation of the industry. After the enactment of the ADA
in 1978, the CAB's responsibilities were gradually and systemati-
cally shifted to other agencies.5 2 Initially, regulatory authority
over mergers was bestowed upon the DOT, but, in 1989, it was
subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ)Y"
Through mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies, the industry
has undergone a transformation unlike any in its history. "Since
1978, we've seen 130 airlines come and go."54
The failure of an airline causes consternation not only for its
employees and the traveling public, but for the airports with
which the airline has lease agreements. Just as the airlines them-
selves benefit from entering into long-term lease agreements, so
too do the airports. The predictable revenue stream resulting
from these leases affords the airport operator a certain sense of
financial security. However, the deregulated environment
under which airlines operate today provides no such assurances.
49 Id. at 559.
50 Levine, supra note 41, at 469.
51 Robert M. Hardaway, The FAA 'Buy-Sell' Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the
Crossroads, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 47 (1986).
52 JEFFERY R. MILLER, THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION HANDBOOK 11-12 (1981).
53 Alberto G. Rossi, Grounding Future Consolidations: United-US Airways Cancel
Right, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 883, 886 (2002).
54 Perry Flint, Washington's Shadow of Doubt; Airline Deregulation, AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD, May 1998, at 47 (quoting Professor Daryl Jenkins, director of the Avia-




The unfortunate result of deregulation has been the unprece-
dented number of bankruptcies within the industry.55 Legisla-
tion was enacted in 1992 in an attempt to protect some of the
nation's airport operators from this all-too-frequent occur-
rence.56 The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act,57 Section
19, "Airport Leases," "amends Section 365(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that the unexpired airport facility leases of a
bankrupt airline are deemed rejected, at the option of the air-
port operator, five days after a so-called termination event."58
Under the statute, a termination event was rather narrowly de-
fined as a Chapter 7 liquidation, conversion of an existing bank-
ruptcy reorganization to a liquidation, or the granting of certain
relief to creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. 9 The statute was
further restrictive "in that it only applie[d] to an air carrier
holding at least 65% of the gates of a facility that qualifies as a
'large air traffic hub,' as defined by FAA regulations .... -60 Fi-
nally, the statute was applicable only for a period of 12 months,
expiring in September 1993.61 Although intended to address an
issue of growing concern within the industry, the limited scope
of this statute necessarily rendered it ineffective.
While an airline's bankruptcy inflicts many financial hard-
ships both on the airline and its creditors, it is often the compet-
itor airlines that are in a position to benefit from the other's
misfortune. In Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
Midway, after ceasing operations due to bankruptcy, was in de-
fault on its gate lease agreement at Minneapolis/St. Paul Inter-
national Airport (MSP).62 Northwest Airlines bid on Midway's
leasehold interest, offering to satisfy the amount in default,
along with an additional $5,000.63 Despite objections from the
Metropolitan Airports Commission (the operator of MSP), the
55 In recent years, many airlines have filed Chapter 13 and several have done
so twice or more.
56 Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act, Pub. L. No. 102-365, 106 Stat. 972
(1992).
57 Id.
58 Anthony Michael Sabino, Protecting Airport Operators' Terminal and Gate Leases
from Airline Bankruptcies, 2J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 75, 75 (1993).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 76.
61 Id.
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals assigned the lease to North-
west.64 It is noteworthy that, at the time of this litigation, North-
west operated a hub at MSP, leasing 75% of the gates there.6"
2. New Entrants
Yet another significant impact of deregulation is the number
of new entrant carriers that have begun operations since 1978.
As discussed supra, prior to deregulation, the CAB issued certifi-
cates of convenience authorizing airlines to commence opera-
tions. The litmus test for issuance of such certificates was that
the carrier be "fit, willing and able," and the service was to be
required by "the public convenience and necessity. '66 This stan-
dard resulted in the CAB's issuance of only six such certificates
in the twenty years preceding deregulation. By contrast, today's
standard under deregulation requires that "[t] he applicant must
still be "fit, willing and able," but the board must issue a certifi-
cate if the transportation is "consistent with the public conve-
nience and necessity."67 This standard has resulted in the
issuance of an increasing number of certificates, based in part
on the fact that such consistency is presumed under the ADA.
Moreover, "the burden is on any opponents of the applicant to
demonstrate any inconsistency with the public convenience and
necessity. 68
This acquiescence in the standard for obtaining a certificate
seemingly paves the way for the new-entrant carrier. However,
although clearly an essential component for entry, obtaining a
certificate is but one small piece of a large and complex puzzle.
The mere authority to operate an airline does not include such
other requisite elements as gates and terminal space. Once
granted the authority to operate, an airline must gain access to
airport facilities. While deregulation has made it infinitely eas-
ier for airlines to become certificated, the same may not be said
for their ability to gain access to some of the nation's airports.
The hub and spoke system, discussed supra, represents a for-
midable obstacle to the new-entrant airline. In establishing it-
self at a hub airport, the incumbent airline conducts a
disproportionate share of the flights operating from that air-
64 Id. at 497.
65 Id. at 494 n.1.
66 MILLER, supra note 21, at 9 (emphasis added).




port.69 Due to the economies of scale inherent in such an oper-
ation, it becomes a financial hardship for competitors to gain
sufficient market share. 70 Assuming, arguendo, that a new en-
trant airline elects to compete with a dominant carrier at a hub
airport, it must acquire the necessary facilities to do so. "Among
the most remarked-upon impediments to contestability in the
deregulated airline industry has been the 'shortage' of terminal
facilities, especially gate space. ' 71 Incumbent airlines can deter
the new entrant by employing any of a number of strategies:
tying up existing gates through the use of long-term, exclusive
leases; using their Majority-In-Interest status, discussed infra, to
limit construction of additional space; and subleasing gate space
to the new entrant at above-market prices, just to name a few.72
C. SLOT ALLOCATION
After having successfully overcome the gate barriers, the new
entrant has positioned itself to begin service. Operating under
the premise that the airline intends to, ultimately, if not initially,
generate a profit from its revenues, it must schedule its flights so
as to attract the greatest number of passengers. This piece of
the puzzle may entail obtaining the right to take off and land at
the airport, known as a "slot." "A slot.., is a designated thirty
minute window of time during which an air carrier may launch
or land daily air traffic. ' 75 Certain airports, referred to as slot-
controlled airports, are subject to the "high density rule,"
adopted by the FAA in 1968 as a measure to reduce conges-
tion. 4 The airports initially targeted were Chicago O'Hare
(ORD); New York John F. Kennedy International (JFK); New
York LaGuardia (LGA); New York Newark (EWR); and Washing-
ton National (DCA).7 Although the FAA reserved the right to
include additional airports in this list, none were subsequently
added.76 Moreover, despite being initially touted as a temporary
measure, the rule has been retained indefinitely. 77
69 Levine, supra note 41, at 468-69.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 463.
72 Id. at 469-70.
73 Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No.1:95-cv-2896-GET,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *9 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 1996).
74 Eileen M. Gleimer, Slot Regulation at High Density Airports: How Did We Get
Here and Where Are We Going?, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 877, 878 (1996).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 878-79.
77 Id. at 880.
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Prior to deregulation, competing airlines convened their re-
spective Scheduling Committees to allocate the slots equitably
among them.7' These agreements were submitted to, and com-
monly approved by, the CAB. 7' Any conflicts noted by the CAB
were to be resolved via voluntary adjustments by the airlines
themselves."' "Because of the requirement that schedule
changes be voluntary, the schedule changes could not be made
unless there was unanimity among the affected carriers. Not
surprisingly, unanimity was difficult to achieve and at times im-
possible, particularly after deregulation."'" This phenomenon
served to exacerbate the difficulties encountered by new-entrant
airlines.
In an effort to ameliorate this apparent inequity, in 1985 the
FAA instituted the "buy-sell rule," which provided that "perma-
nent slots... could be purchased, sold, traded, or leased by any
party... on a daily, weekly, monthly, or any other basis. 8s2 Em-
bodied within this rule was a "use-or-lose" provision, requiring
airlines to use their slots a specified percentage of the time to
avoid forfeiting them. 3 In theory, this was to make underutil-
ized slots available for new entrants.8 4 In practical application,
however, the airlines in possession of the slots leased them to
competitors, on a short-term basis, "to meet the minimum use
requirement since the leasing mechanism also limits the com-
petitor's ability to gain a permanent foothold at the airport. 8 5
Such an arrangement allows the incumbent airline to retain pos-
session and control of the slots, while potentially charging
above-market rates for the lease. Although the new entrant has
gained access to the airport, it has done so on a short-term basis
and at great expense.
Under the present regulatory structure, although many pri-
vate airports exist today, "major air carrier airports in the United
States are operated by public entities at the state, regional, or
local level. 81 6 In our nation's capital, for example, the airports
(Washington National, Washington - Dulles, and Baltimore-




82 Id. at 887.
83 Id. at 889.
84 Gleimer, supra note 74, at 889.
85 Id. at 910.
86 49 U.S.C. § 49101(5)(2004).
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Washington International) are all operated by the Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority ("Airports Authority")?. The
Airports Authority is "a political subdivision constituted only to
operate and improve the Metropolitan Washington Airports as
primary airports serving the Metropolitan Washington area. '"88
Among the authority granted to the Airports Authority is the
right "to acquire, maintain, improve, operate, protect, and pro-
mote the Metropolitan Washington Airports for public pur-
poses; to issue bonds. . .; to acquire real and personal
property... ; and to levy fees or other charges." 9
Although the right to levy fees and charges exists, that right is
not without its limitations. The Federal Anti-Head Tax Act for-
bids any state agency to "levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge,
or other charge on an individual traveling in air commerce," or
on "the transportation of an individual traveling in air com-
merce" 90 unless they are "reasonable rental charges, landing
fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the
using airport facilities."91 Additionally, the Airport and Airways
Development Act of 1970 requires that airports receiving federal
subsidies be "available for public use on fair and reasonable
terms and without unjust discrimination."92
D. ANTI-TRUST CONSIDERATIONS
Violation of the above limitations appears in the form of anti-
trust litigation. Such litigation has arisen between and among
the airlines, and between the airlines and airport operators.
Pertinent legislation is Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
which prohibits "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations."93 The
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,94
emphasized that under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,95 de-
signed to halt the growth of monopolies, the offense of monop-
87 49 U.S.C. § 49101(2).
88 49 U.S.C. § 49106(a)(1)(B) (3).
89 49 U.S.C. §§ 49106(b) (1)(A)-(C), (E).
90 49 U.S.C. §§ 40116(b)(1)-(2).
91 49 U.S.C. § 40116(e) (2).
92 Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219.
93 15 U.S.C. § 1.
94 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
95 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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oly has two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or develop-
ment as a consequence of superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident. 96
Arguably among the most contentious aspects of airline anti-
trust litigation are airport lease agreements. Long-term lease
agreements, Majority-In-Interest clauses, hub and spoke opera-
tions, and limited slot and gate availability all give rise to the
potential anti-competitive practices comprising this litigation.
Prior to its dissolution in 1985, the CAB was responsible for re-
viewing and approving "any agreements between carriers affect-
ing air transportation .... -97 "Any agreement approved by the
board was automatically given immunity from the antitrust laws
and was thereby insulated from any antitrust action arising
within the scope of the approved agreement."9 8 The CAB's au-
thority was significantly reduced as a result of the ADA, particu-
larly with respect to mergers and acquisitions, when such
authority was transferred to the Department of Justice.9
To mitigate the effects of the long-term lease agreements, air-
lines have entered into sub-lease agreements. 100 Under these
agreements, facilities such as gates or takeoff and landing slots
are sub-leased to competitor airlines. This allows the lessor air-
line to retain ownership of the facilities while exerting a mea-
sure of control over its competitor lessee. Although the new-
entrant carrier has gained access to an airport, it incurs consid-
erable expense in doing so. The incumbent carrier benefits
from such a sub-lease arrangement in multiple ways. First, it re-
tains ownership of the gate(s), effectively reserving the right to
reclaim them upon termination of the typically short-duration
sub-lease. Second, by sub-leasing the gates, the incumbent has
complied with the common provision in its own lease with the
airport that the gates be used a certain minimum amount. Ab-
sent the sub-lease, the underutilized gates may be forfeited to
the airport, only to potentially be leased to the new-entrant com-
petitor on a long-term basis. Next, the incumbent airline estab-
lishes the lease rate to be paid by the sub-lessee. As might be
96 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
97 MILLER, supra note 21, at 7.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 15.
100 Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport Regulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 47, 54-55
(1991).
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expected, these rates are typically above market rates, by opera-
tion of the law of supply and demand. In an agreement between
Southwest Airlines and Northwest Airlines, for example, North-
west charged "$150 per flight for a sub-lease of two gates or
'about nineteen times what Northwest pays the airport authority
to lease the space."' 01 Finally, not uncommon in such sub-leases
are clauses which require that the lessee also contract the
ground handling services of the lessor.
In Valujet Airlines, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,102 plaintiff
Valujet alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
against two competitor airlines in contracting for takeoff and
landing slots at New York's LaGuardia Airport (LGA).103 Trans
World Airlines (TWA) entered into negotiations with Valujet to
lease six of its Atlanta (ATL) - LGA slots.1 °4 Negotiations slowed
when Valujet objected to TWA's requirement that Valujet also
contract for TWA's ground handling services.'0 5 Believing that
Valujet was no longer interested, TWA began negotiations with
Delta, a dominant, incumbent carrier operating a hub at ATL.106
When TWA and Delta reached agreement on the slot leases,
Valujet asserted its claim that the parties "entered into an illegal
agreement and conspired to restrain trade" and that "Delta has
engaged in illegal acts of monopolization and has attempted to
monopolize the ATL-LGA market. ' 10 7 As to the Section 1
claim, the district court, citing the United States Supreme Court
decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,'08 granted
both defendant airlines' motions for summary judgment, hold-
ing that Valujet failed to prove "that TWA and Delta shared a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to
achieve an unlawful objective."'0 9 The court, citing United States
v. Grinnell Corp.,11 highlighted the two elements of the offense
101 Id. at 54 (quoting DOT SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN THE
U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY: AIRPORTS, AIR TRAFFic CONTROL, AND RELATED
CONCERNS 3-2 (Feb. 1990)).
102 No.1:95-cv-2896-GET, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *9 (N.D. Ga. July 12,
1996).
103 Id. at *24.
104 Id. at *11.
105 Id. at *12.
106 Id. at *17.
107 Id. at *24.
108 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984).
109 No.1:95-cv-2896-GET, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *30 (N.D. Ga. July
12, 1996).
110 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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of monopolization as "(1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or develop-
ment as a consequence of superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident." However it declined to resolve the Section
2 claim, requiring further discovery.'
New York Airlines v. Dukes County, Martha's Vineyard Airport Com-
mission,1 12 addresses anti-trust litigation as it pertains to airports.
New York Air was denied access to the Martha's Vineyard Air-
port (MVY).11 In its antitrust argument, New York Air relied on
Section 1 of the Sherman Act which "makes unlawful any 'con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states.'"11 4 In addition to alleging
that such a contract in fact existed between the Airport and
PBA, an incumbent airline, New York Air was also required to
demonstrate the resultant injury it sustained from such ac-
tion. 1 5 New York Air asserted that its injury stemmed from the
"loss of business opportunity . . . loss of goodwill, and loss of
revenues and profits.""' 6 The Airport moved to dismiss the
claim, arguing that under state law and pursuant to the Parker
Doctrine," 7 its actions are exempt from anti-trust laws." 8 The
district court denied this motion, holding, inter alia, that the
Parker Doctrine was inapplicable, because the doctrine excludes
conduct undertaken "pursuant to state policy to displace compe-
tition with regulation or monopoly public service. '' 1
In a challenge to the rates imposed upon them by the airport,
the two plaintiff airlines in Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. County
of Pitkin120 alleged that the charges were "excessive, unreasona-
ble, and discriminatory in violation of federal and state law.' 12 1
The Aspen/Pitkin County Airport is owned and operated by Pit-
111 Valujet Airlines, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *14 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2004)).
112 623 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mass. 1985).
113 Id. at 1440.
114 Id. at 1450 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (providing an exemption for
state conduct if undertaken to displace competition with regulation of monopoly
public service).
118 623 F. Supp. at 1451.
119 Id.; see also Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).




kin County, a political subdivision of the state of Colorado. To
fund terminal expansion, the county increased both the landing
fees and terminal rental fees, resulting in the airlines paying
over fifty percent of the airport's operating revenues for only
twenty-nine percent of the airport's operations. 122 Among the
claims made by the plaintiff airlines were the arguments "that
the Airport holds a monopoly position, and that the fees and
rentals are unreasonable and therefore in violation of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.' 1 23 A Colorado statute provided that the
operations of airport facilities were "to be public government
functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
necessity."'21 4 The district court granted the county's motion to
dismiss, holding that "Pitkin County is undeniably acting in its
governmental (rather than proprietary) capacity and ... is im-
mune from the operation of federal antitrust laws.' '1 25
IV. AIRLINE-AIRPORT AGREEMENTS
Facilities lease agreements between airlines and airports are
intricately detailed, delineating such matters as fees, the loca-
tion of facilities, duration, and exclusivity. Furthermore, these
agreements also detail landing fees, rate calculation methods,
and revenue/cost sharing formulas. One of the primary factors
in constructing these agreements is to designate them as exclu-
sive or non-exclusive.
A. EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS
If an airline has a significant presence at a particular airport,
it may elect to enter into an exclusive lease agreement, which
provides that only that airline will have the use of the specific
facilities. 126 This means that access to these facilities would be
unavailable to other airlines who may wish to gain entry.
Such exclusive agreements have the potential to be mutually
beneficial to the tenant airline and the landlord airport. While
the airline has encumbered itself to the extent that it has as-
sumed an obligation to make the lease payments, it has also
gained control over the gate and terminal space, to the exclu-
122 Id. at 314.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 316 (quoting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 41-4-101).
125 Id.
126 Telephone Interview with Mr. Jeffrey Letwin, Solicitor, Allegheny County
Airport Authority (Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Letwin Interview].
2004]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
sion of potential competitors. The airport, for its part, effec-
tively relinquishes control of the facilities. However, in the
process, it gains the assurance of a predictable revenue stream.
At issue in Air Canada v. Department of Transportation127 was an
agreement between American Airlines (American) and Dade
County for construction and renovation of facilities at Miami In-
ternational Airport (MIA) .12' The agreement provided that
"[A] merican will have exclusive use of the A/D gates so long as
it averages 250 jet flights per day. ' 129 The funding for this con-
struction project derived in part from increased fees charged to
all airlines operating at MIA, resulted in several airlines chal-
lenging the reasonableness of the fee increases. The DOT as-
signed the dispute to an administrative law judge, who found
the fees unreasonable, holding that American should pay a
larger share of the costs.130 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, however, denied the airlines' claims, stating
"[b]ecause facilities are renovated at different times, some air-
lines will always be subsidizing improvements to facilities used by
other airlines.' 13' Such reasoning presupposes that the airlines
will collectively continue leasing facilities at MIA, so as to realize
the long-term benefits of the improvements.1 3 2
Recent industry trends seem to indicate a desire on the part
of airport operators to limit these exclusive lease agreements.
At airports where one airline accounts for more than fifty per-
cent of the passenger volume, federal law requires the submis-
sion of a plan to increase competition in order to be eligible for
the federal financial aid necessary to fund expansion. 33 In De-
cember, 2000, officials at Atlanta Hartsfield International Air-
port (ATL) submitted such a plan, committing "to end as much
as possible the practice of signing exclusive gate lease agree-
ments and to require airlines that have lease agreements to
meet usage goals or lose control of their gates.' 34 The plan also
proposed a new option, known as preferential gate agreements,
under which "an airline would hold dominant rights to a gate.
127 148 F.3d 1142, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1148.
131 Id. at 1151 n.14.
132 Id.
133 Gary Hendricks, Hartsfield City Limits: FAA Studies Airport's Plan to Increase
Competition, ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, January 15, 2001.
134 Id.
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But if the airport determined the gate was under-utilized, the
airport could allow another airline to use it. ' 13 5 Another exam-
ple of this trend is evident at Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport (DFW), which has vowed to "transition out of exclusive-
use agreements for the future." '136 Citing as a primary factor the
concern that an under-utilized, exclusively-leased gate will be
unavailable for use by another carrier, agreements for gates in a
new terminal, planned to open in 2005, will contain provisions
permitting another carrier to use the unused facilities of the ten-
ant airline.1 3 7
1. Long-Term Leases
As noteworthy as their exclusivity is the duration of lease
agreements. "Historically, most airports have leased space to air-
lines on an exclusive basis for extended periods of time, usually
15 to 30 years."1 38 Agreements dating back to the 1940s are in-
dicative of this tendency. "In 1942 the City and County of San
Francisco ... entered into a formal agreement ... with Trans
World Airlines .. .for a twenty-year term. ' 139 The trend has
since continued as evinced by the lease agreement currently in
effect between the city of Philadelphia, which is the governing
entity for the Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), and US
Airways. 40 That agreement was entered into in 1974 and is set
to expire in 2006.141 Such a thirty-two year agreement, while
arguably at the upper limit in terms of duration, is not atypical.
In Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope,1 4 2 for example, Sec-
tion 352 of New York General Municipal Law authorizes the lo-
cal legislative body which operates local airports "to enter into
exclusive and non-exclusive contracts . . .not exceeding forty
years."71 43
135 Id.
136 Bryon Okada, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport Wants to Shorten Exclusive-Use Gate
Leases, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, October 19, 2003, at 8B.
137 Id.
138 Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J.
319, 333 (1983).
139 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473, 474 (9th
Cir. 1955).
4o Marcia Gelbart, Aide Asks about Getting Gates from US Airways at Philadelphia
Airport, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, August 22, 2002, at 1C.
141 Id.
142 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1986).
143 Id. at 95-96.
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2. Majority-in-Interest
Such long-term agreements, particularly in an industry as vol-
atile as the airline industry, may cause one to question their ulti-
mate usefulness. Perhaps one of the most significant features of
the long-term exclusive lease agreements has been the majority-
in-interest clause (the MII clause). As defined in the Airline
Operating Agreement and Terminal Building Lease at Pitts-
burgh International Airport (PIT), "[m] ajority-in-interest
means, during any Fiscal Year, either: (1) forty percent (40%) in
number of all Signatory Airlines which, in the aggregate, paid
fifty percent (50%) or more of Landing Fees paid by all Signa-
tory Airlines for the preceding Fiscal Year; or (2) all except one
(1) of the Signatory Airlines regardless of the amount of landing
Fees paid by such Signatory Airline." '144 The M11 clauses "give
airlines a voice in airport decisions affecting airport-airline fi-
nancial commitments."' 45 Airlines have, in effect, "power that
ranges from the right to veto expansion at an airport, to the
right to approve large capital projects, to the ability to adjust
landing fees or terminal rental fees, to the right to approve
bond sales to raise capital for new construction. 146
In Air Canada, Inc. v. Dade County & American Airlines,'47 sev-
eral airlines brought action against Dade County, the operator
of MIA, and one airline tenant, American, alleging that an
agreement between American and the County for construction
of a new terminal, to be used exclusively by American, was in
violation of the agreements between the airlines and the
County. 4 ' Specifically, the airlines argued that, under the terms
of a 1954 Trust Agreement (Trust), they had a "contractual
right to approve all airport projects which are to be funded by
the issuance of airport revenue bonds under Section 210" of the
Trust.149  The airlines relied on language in Supplemental
Agreements, granting MII airlines certain approval rights. That
language read, in relevant part, "[a]dditional amendments to
the projects... shall be subject to the approval of the Majority-
144 Pittsburgh International Airport - Airline Operating Agreement and Termi-
nal Building Lease 15 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Pittsburgh
Agreement].
145 Russell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and Other Exclusionary Conduct in the
Airline Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution ?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281, 332 (1992).
146 Imes, supra note 22, at 1079.
147 No. 95-2037, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2534 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 1998).
148 Id. at *2.
149 Id.
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In-Interest of Airlines. ' 150  Holding that the Supplemental
Agreements did not require such MII approval, the district court
found "that the parties intended that the MII Airlines have ap-
proval over only those projects proposed by the County as
amendments to the existing list of approved projects."' 1 While
the MII clause was not upheld in Air Canada, Inc. v. Dade County,
such clauses remain an integral part of many of today's existing
lease agreements. "As of 1990, fifty-five airports in the United
States functioned with MII clauses."'1 52
B. NON-EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS
The other side of the exclusive lease coin reveals the non-ex-
clusive lease agreement. Airlines which operate only a minimal
number of flights at a given airport may opt for a non-exclusive
lease. 53 Under such an arrangement, the facilities are shared
among two or more airlines, each of which utilizes them during
certain times of the day. This is cost-effective for the individual
airlines, given that the lease charges are shared between them.
The airport, in turn, derives benefits from the fact that its facili-
ties are being efficiently utilized, and by retaining control of its
facilities as a result of the non-exclusive lease.' 54 At Kansas City
International Airport (MCI), for example, "most key opera-
tional areas including hold rooms and gates are leased on a non-
exclusive basis, meaning that the airport can re-lease those areas
to other carriers if they are not fully used."'155
At Love Field in Dallas (DAL), a 1998 agreement between
American Airlines and Continental Airlines provides for the car-
riers to share two gates. 56 The airport's Aviation Director or-
dered the share agreement pursuant to the city's authority
under a "scarce resources" clause contained in the agree-
ment. 157 Under the agreement, each airline will have primary
use of its own gate, but, at certain times of the day, each will
150 Id. at *17.
151 Id. at *18.
152 Imes, supra note 22, at 1080.
153 Letwin Interview, supra note 126.
154 Id.
155 Kansas City Airport Bonds Get A2 Rating On Local Economy, Low-Cost Operations,
AIRPORTS, September 14, 1999, Vol.16, No. 37 at 382, available at http://
www.aviationnow.com.
156 American, Continental Settle Differences Over Love Field Gate Sharing, AVIATION
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have access to the other's main gate. 158 Such a clause permits
effective and efficient allocation of resources and is made possi-
ble within the framework of a non-exclusive agreement, since
the airport retains a greater degree of control over its assets
than would be the case in an exclusive lease agreement.1 59
C. SIGNATORY AND NON-SIGNATORY AIRLINES
In addition to the lease agreements being classified as exclu-
sive or non-exclusive, the individual airlines are designated as
either signatory or non-signatory, depending upon whether or
not they have signed a lease agreement for a specified duration.
A signatory airline "has an airline operating agreement and ter-
minal building lease substantially identical in all respects.., and
with the same expiration date. ' 160 At Denver International Air-
port (DIA) "[a] irlines that have executed qualifying lease agree-
ments with the City ("signatory airlines") pay different rental
rates than airlines that do not have such agreements ("non-sig-
natory airlines"), and signatory airlines receive a credit for their
share of the airport's net revenues. "161 "Non-signatory airlines
pay rates that are 20% higher than the rates charged to signa-
tory airlines, and non-signatory airlines are not credited with any
portion of net airport revenues. 162 Such a 20% premium exists
for non-signatory carriers operating at Pittsburgh International
Airport (PIT) as well, and is the generally accepted industry
standard.1 6' The airport charges a premium to offset the fact
that non-signatory airlines are not committing themselves to a
lease for a specified term.1 64
D. USER CLASSIFICATIONS
This leads us to the classification of the two distinct types of
users of airport facilities, and the various calculation methods
employed to determine their respective fees. "Airports collect
the bulk of their revenues from two general groups of users: aer-
onautical users, such as commercial (passenger) airlines, and
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 21.
161 Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. City of Denver, No.1995 DOT Av. LEXIS 456, at
*9 (July 21, 1995).
162 Id.
163 Informational brochure: Fees, Charges and Operational Information, 2003,




non-aeronautical concessionaires, including car rental agencies,
parking lots, restaurants, gift shops, and other small vendors." 165
Although the latter group is not the focus of this article, a brief
discussion of concessionaire agreements and their fees is none-
theless appropriate, given that such agreements have a signifi-
cant impact on the aeronautical user agreements.
1. Non-Aeronautical Users
One example of a non-aeronautical concessionaire agreement
is between the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port
Authority), which is the operator of Newark International Air-
port (EWR), and of independent concessionaires.
Under the terms of the lease, concessionaires have an exclusive
or semi-exclusive right to sell various merchandise including
newspapers in a particular terminal. For this right, the conces-
sionaires pay a fixed base rent plus approximately 17-1/2 percent
of their gross sales. These lease payments from the concession-
aires are shared between the Port Authority and the airline [s] .166
Individual concessionaires enter into these special lease agree-
ments to gain the right to use the terminal space, but "use of
that space is subject to the ultimate control and regulation of
the Port Authority. 1 67
Another form of this type of agreement may be found be-
tween airports and rental car companies. At Minneapolis-St.
Paul Metropolitan Airport (MSP), agreements between the Met-
ropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) and rental car compa-
nies are further categorized as "off-Airport" and "on-Airport. '168
"Off-Airport rental car companies pick up customers at the Air-
port, but do not otherwise rent space ... on Airport property."
"On-Airport rental car companies rent space at the Airport from
MAC and maintain service counters ... on Airport property."169
Under MAC Ordinance 85, the fee for off-Airport companies is
8.5% of gross receipts for those transactions taking place on air-
port property. While not subject to Ordinance 85, on-Airport
companies still pay a fee of 8.5% of gross revenues (all of which
165 Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. Dep't of Transp., 119 F.3d 38, 39 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
166 Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., v. Stephen Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140,
143 (D. N.J. 1989).
167 Id. at 156.
168 Enter. Leasing Co. v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 250 F.3d 1215, 1217 (8th
Cir. 2001).
169 Id. at 1216 n.1.
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are necessarily presumed to have occurred on Airport prop-
erty), "as well as rental fees based on the amount of Airport
space they occupy.' 170 In Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Metropolitan Air-
ports Commission, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
MAC was operating within its statutory authority in imposing
such fees.171 The Enterprise court also deemed the 8.5% fee to be
reasonable, noting other airports' fees to be as high as 10% of
gross revenues. 172
2. Aeronautical Users
Aeronautical users consist primarily of passenger-carrying air-
lines, although air cargo and general aviation operations are
also included.173 The source of the airport revenues generated
by these aeronautical users may be traced to the fee structure
and the accounting method employed at a particular airport.174
E. FEE STRUCTURES
There are two basic types of fee structures in use between air-
ports and airlines: the residual model and the compensatory
model. 175 Under the residual cost method, "[t]he airline as-
sumes the greater financial risk by guaranteeing payment of air-
port costs. ' 176 Conversely, under the compensatory method,
"[t] he airport authority assumes the financial risk for its opera-
tions, and charges airlines on a cost-recovery basis. ' 177 A third
finance method, known as the modified compensatory model, is
in use at PIT. 178 These finance methods are chosen by the air-
port operator and each method has its own unique advantages
and disadvantages.
1. Residual Method
Under the residual model, all revenues (including conces-
sionaire revenues) generated at the airport are offset against all
costs.' 7 9 Any residual revenue is refunded to the airlines at year
170 Id. at 1216.
171 Id. at 1223.
172 Id. at 1222 n.10.









end, in proportion to their level of usage of the airport. 8 ° A
fortiori, any deficit is correspondingly charged to the airlines.'
The impact on the tenant airlines of the non-aeronautical con-
cessionaire agreements discussed supra, is most prominent in
this model.1 12 The airport develops a budget, making necessary
modifications at mid-year. Any surplus or deficit in revenue as a
result of gains or losses relating to the concessionaire agree-
ments is reflected in this budgetary recalculation process. The
amount refunded to the airlines in the event of a surplus, or,
conversely, the amount charged to the airlines in the event of a
deficit, is directly impacted by the concessionaire agreements.18 3
At Stapleton International Airport (Stapleton) in Denver, Colo-
rado, concessionaire "revenues exceed the costs attributed by
Denver for the provision and use of the facilities."'8 4 The City
and County of Denver, as owner and operator of Stapleton, re-
tains this surplus revenue in the Stapleton Capital Improvement
and Replacement Fund, which has "[hiistorically ... been used
for capital expenditures and extraordinary maintenance costs at
Stapleton.""1 5 Such a practice exemplifies the overlap and im-
pact of non-aeronautical concessionaire agreements upon aero-
nautical user agreements. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of
Kent, Michigan,1 8 6 the tenant airlines challenged the validity of
the fee structure at Kent County International Airport (Kent).
The claim, in relevant part, challenged Kent's allocation of reve-
nues and costs among the three distinct user groups: commer-
cial airlines, general aviation, and non-aeronautical
concessionaires. 87 Under the airport's accounting system, gen-
eral aviation was being undercharged, while concessionaires
were being overcharged. 88 The airlines alleged, inter alia, that a
portion of the airfield costs should have been allocated to the
concessionaires. 18 9 Affirming the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the United States Supreme Court held that the fee struc-
ture was reasonable and applied the three part test developed in





184 City of Denver v. Cont'l Airlines, 712 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D. Colo. 1989).
185 Id.
186 510 U.S. 355 (1994).
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Inc.9 ' Under the Evansville-Vanderburgh test, a fee is held to be
reasonable if it reflects a "uniform, fair and practical standard,"
is based upon a fair approximation of use, "and is neither dis-
criminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in com-
parison with the governmental benefit conferred."'191 The
residual method was in use at Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX) until the end of 1992; however, the City of Los Angeles,
the operator of LAX, elected to adopt the compensatory
method instead.1 92 Perhaps anticipating a challenge to the rea-
sonableness of its fee structure, the city concluded "that the
practice of setting the annual landing fee so that total airport
revenues would match total airport expenses resulted in a land-
ing fee that was heavily subsidized by non-aeronautical
revenues."19 3
2. Compensatory Method
Under the compensatory model, airline rates are fixed via
arms-length negotiations between airport and airline represent-
atives.1 94 Such rates vary among tenant airlines, based upon
their status as signatory or non-signatory. Any surplus revenue
goes to the airport, and any budget deficit is borne by the air-
port. 1 95 The terminal complex rental fees for signatory airlines
at PIT are calculated by multiplying the number of square feet
of leased space by the terminal complex rental rate. 96 The ter-
minal complex rental rate is "[d] etermined by dividing the net
cost of the Terminal Complex Area ... by the total number of
square feet of Leased Premises of all Signatory Airlines" '97 At
Denver International Airport (DIA), "[t] he City uses a "commer-
cial compensatory" methodology to establish the terminal com-
plex rental rates.9' Under this methodology, the passenger
airlines pay the fully allocated cost of the space that they lease or
use . . .plus their share of common use facilities and services.
Signatory airlines would pay an average terminal complex rental
190 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
191 Id. at 714, 716-17.
192 L.A. Dep't of Airports v. United States Dep't of Transp., 103 F.3d 1027,
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
193 Id.
194 Letwin Interview, supra note 126.
195 Id.
196 Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 69.
197 Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
198 Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. City of Denver, 1995 DOT Av. LEXIS 456, at *8
(July 21, 1995).
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rate of $61.98 per square foot, and non-signatory airlines would
pay $74.38 per square foot."1 99 Common use facilities are de-
fined as "[t] hose areas and facilities used in common by the sev-
eral airlines. '20 0 Such areas include "[1]anding fields, runways,
aprons, taxi-ways, sewerage, water facilities, various lights and
signals, control tower service and other conveniences supplied
by the airport. '20 1 As can be seen from these figures, non-signa-
tory airlines are charged a 20% premium as compared to signa-
tory airlines, an industry-wide standard.
The modified compensatory model, not surprisingly, features
a combination of the other two models. Individual portions of
the lease agreement subscribe to either the residual or the com-
pensatory model.202 Airside agreements (gates and gate space)
may be a combination of the two models, and landside agree-
ments (ticket counter space) may be a combination of the two
models. 20 ' Those portions of the agreement that subscribe to
the residual model are accordingly subject to the residual rules
as relates to budget surpluses and deficits, as discussed supra.
Similarly, those portions of the agreement which follow the
compensatory model must conform to the compensatory rules
pertaining to surpluses and deficits.20 4
A variant of the above method was used at the Raleigh-Dur-
ham Airport in Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.20 5 Known as a "cost of services system," this method sepa-
rates each operating area's revenues and costs from the
others.206 The two principle operating areas are land-side (ter-
minal, concessions) and airside (aviation) operations. 2 7 This
"[t]wo cash register system . . . requires land-side and airside
operations to support themselves independently of the profits
or losses of the other. 2
0 8
In addition to the basic models used for calculating fees and
rates, the location of the specific facilities has also been the sub-
ject of lease negotiations. Airlines place a certain inherent value
199 Id.
200 Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 220 F.2d 473, 474 (9th
Cir. 1956).
201 Id.
202 Letwin Interview, supra note 126.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 429 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (D.N.C. 1976).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1078.
208 Id.
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on the location of their leased space, with convenience and ac-
cessibility for their passengers among the prime considerations.
In Southern Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,2°9 Southern Airways
was dissatisfied with the allocation plan for future gate space, to
be made available as a result of construction of a proposed mid-
field terminal at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport
(ATL).21° Southern proposed that the average rent cost per
square foot be increased or decreased, depending on the loca-
tion of the space, ranging from a 25% premium to a 25% dis-
count.211 After unsuccessful attempts to resolve the dispute with
Eastern Air Lines, a competitor airline, "Southern requested the
city of Atlanta to rule upon the matter. The city refused to do
so, stating that 'gate allocations is a matter for the airlines to
agree upon among themselves."' 212 In contrast to the policy at
ATL, PIT allocates space based on the total number of assigned
aircraft parking positions held by signatory airlines. Under this
system, each signatory airline with fewer than fourteen assigned
aircraft parking positions is entitled to preferential assignment
of one position; for those signatory airlines with fourteen or
more assigned aircraft parking positions, fifteen percent of the
total number are preferentially assigned. The balance of these
parking positions is exclusively assigned.213
3. Landing Fees
The last, and perhaps most significant, element of the agree-
ments to be discussed is landing fees. The typical landing fee
structure is based upon aircraft weight and the number of land-
ings, "the weight of each plane to be calculated by taking the
maximum allowable landing weight ... as fixed by the Federal
Aviation Administration. 21 4 The landing fees are expressed in
terms of a rate per one thousand pounds of maximum allowable
landing weight. In an agreement entered into in 1971 between
the Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority and its tenant commer-
cial airlines, the rate was thirteen cents per one thousand
pounds landed.215 At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX),
209 S. Airways, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 428 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
210 Id. at 1013.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Pittsburgh Agreement, supra note 144, at 36.
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the rate was calculated using the residual method, discussed
supra, until 1992, and was thus variable from year to year. In
1982, the rate was seventy-five cents per one thousand pounds;
in 1989 it decreased to twenty-six cents; in 1992 it was fifty-one
cents per one thousand pounds.2 16 The 2003 published rate for
non-signatory airlines at the Pittsburgh International Airport
(PIT) was $2.09 per one thousand pounds.217 To provide a
frame of reference, at the maximum allowable landing weight
for a Boeing 737-400 airliner of 121,000 pounds, the 1971 rate at
Raleigh-Durham would have yielded a landing fee of $15.73 per
landing (acknowledging that the B-737-400 was not yet in use at
that time).218 By comparison, the 2003 PIT rate results in a
landing fee of $252.89.219 This seemingly wide disparity in fees
is due in part to the thirty-year lapse of time, as well as to the
difference in rates for signatory and non-signatory airlines.
There have been numerous challenges to the reasonableness
of the fees established by airports. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Air-
port Authority v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,22° several airlines challenged
the constitutionality of a one dollar per commercial airline pas-
senger charge, intended "to help defray the costs of airport con-
struction and maintenance. '221 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and validated such a
charge, provided that it reflects a "uniform, fair and practical
standard," is based upon a fair approximation of use, "and is
neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor exces-
sive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred.
222
In New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Author-
ity, 2 23 airport users challenged the validity of a new landing fee
structure at Boston-Logan International Airport (BOS).224 In
1988, the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) enacted a
program, known as the Program for Airport Capacity Efficiency
(PACE), designed to "maximize the efficient use of Logan Air-
216 L.A. Dep't of Airports, v. United States Dep't of Transp., 103 F.3d 1027,
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
217 Informational brochure: Fees, Charges and Operational Information, 2003,
Pittsburgh International Airport (copy on file with the author).
218 US AiRWAYS B-737 PILOT'S HANDBOOK, 2-6.
219 Id.
220 405 U.S. 707, 708 (1972).
221 Id. at 709.
222 Id. at 716-17.
223 883 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1989).
224 Id.
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port. ' 225 The new landing fee structure contained within PACE
departed from the standard landing weight-based method and,
instead, calculated landing fees based on a flat fee of $91.78 per
landing, plus a charge of $0.5417 per one thousand pounds of
landed aircraft weight.226 This resulted in disproportionately
higher fees for smaller aircraft and a reduction in fees for air-
lines. Relying on Evansville-Vanderburgh, the district court held
that the fee structure was "reasonable because it had been fixed
according to [a] uniform, fair and practical standard ... and
was non-excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred. '227 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision.
Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines, Inc.228 in-
volved another dispute over the reasonableness of fees charged.
After the expiration of several airlines' leases, the Indianapolis
Airport Authority unilaterally imposed a new user fee on the air-
lines, in the form of an increase in the per square foot rental
charge, from $17.55 to $21.95.229 The airlines alleged that this
fee, allocated on the amount of space used, assigned dispropor-
tionately lower costs to smaller users such as concessionaires. 230
A second component of the disproportionate charges resulted
from the Airport Authority's failure to collect landing fees from
general aviation users. The airlines, meanwhile, were subjected
to an increase in the landing fee rate, from $0.46 to $0.6771 per
one thousand pounds gross landing weight. 231 The Airport Au-
thority reasoned that the cost of collecting those fees from gen-
eral aviation users would equal nearly half of the amount of the
fee itself.2 2 Instead, the Airport Authority imposed a "fuel flow-
age fee," a charge per gallon of fuel consumed. The flowage
fee, however, failed to generate adequate revenue in relation to
general aviation costs. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's holding that the disproportionality of
the fee was unreasonable and the court invalidated the fee.233
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 162.
228 733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
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V. CONCLUSION
During the more than forty years of regulation, the airlines
have enjoyed government subsidies, protection from competi-
tion, and anti-trust immunity. Since the advent of deregulation
in 1978, however, the airline industry has undergone monumen-
tal changes. Dozens of upstart airlines have emerged and failed
under this deregulated structure. The relatively few new-en-
trant, low-cost carriers that have survived have gained a foothold
and now provide formidable competition to the established car-
riers that remain. These new-entrant carriers take issue with the
long-term, exclusive agreements between established carriers
and airport proprietors. But, through such leases, the estab-
lished carriers have provided a predictable revenue stream for
airport proprietors for decades. It is the very existence of these
agreements which has made available the facilities that the new-
entrant carriers now enjoy. Revenues generated through these
agreements have been used to fund airport construction and ex-
pansion projects, the benefit of which has accrued to new-en-
trant carriers in recent years. The established carriers have
subsidized the infrastructure of today's aviation environment in
such areas as the development, expansion, and renovation of
hub airports. While competitors raise objections to the existing
agreements on anti-trust grounds, they nevertheless derive reve-
nues from these facilities without having incurred the commit-
ments and obligations associated with such agreements.
While non-signatory airlines are charged an industry-standard
premium of twenty percent above the lease rates for signatory
carriers, this differential is designed to compensate the airport
proprietor for the carriers' unwillingness to commit to a lease
for a specified term. It does not address the fact that the estab-
lished carriers have incurred long-term obligations in exchange
for their long-term, exclusive leases. Recognizing the vast obli-
gations and commitments assumed by the established carriers as
a result of entering into long-term agreements many years ago,
some commensurate level of contribution by the new-entrant
carriers would be appropriate, such as requiring a portion of
revenues to be directed to an airport improvement fund,
whether nationally or at individual airports. Contributions from
carriers which have not participated in long-term leases would
be at a higher percentage than their competitors. Under such a
system, all carriers could choose to avail themselves of the bene-
fits of long-term lease agreements, provided they are willing to
assume the obligation of commitment.
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Finally, the composition of the airport's fee structure in lease
agreements has also seen challenges from the airlines. These
challenges have most commonly been in reference to the alloca-
tion of costs and revenues among the airport's users, namely
aeronautical and non-aeronautical. As government entities, air-
ports and their proprietors may establish these fees. As long as
the airport and its facilities are accessible to its users on a non-
discriminatory basis, the fees are generally deemed to be reason-
able. Potential future disputes may be avoided by establishing a
nationwide formula for allocation of costs and revenues, with
individual adjustments for specific airports to be negotiated be-
tween the carriers and the airport proprietor.
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